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THE RELIEF STATE
In its characterisation of the 'relief state' in contemporary India, the paper will build on a rich literature concerning the relief functions of the colonial state (Dreze, 1994) . The contribution that it seeks to make may be situated within a larger body of research described as 'disaster politics' (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Pelling and Dill, 2009 ) especially as the subject of state disaster relief has received rather little attention here (Fred Cuny's 1983 classic titled Disasters and Development remains an exception). Greater emphasis has been placed on the role of international actors in providing humanitarian aid and relief after a severe disaster (Clark, 2005; Korf, 2005; Pelling, 2003) . In recent years however, scholars have focused on state relief following major disasters in India (Simpson and Corbridge, 2006; Simpson, 2008 for the Gujarat earthquake of 2001 and Ray-Bennett, 2009; Samal et al, 2005 for the Odisha super-cyclone of 1999).
Rationale for disaster relief and the ethics of assistance
India has a coherent administrative structure for determining and delivering disaster relief.
Successive Finance Commissions (constituted every 5 years) have consistently included guidelines on disaster relief, given its salience for centre-state fiscal relations. In 2005, the Parliament passed the National Disaster Management Act that envisaged the creation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) as the apex body for disaster management in the country (GOI, 2005) . The Act sets out the various aspects of state response to a disaster in subsequent phases (such as preparedness, response, evacuation and rescue, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction amongst others). But while it clarifies the duties and powers of NDMA and the state governments for providing relief, it does not illuminate how exactly the state views its own obligations towards the victims of a disaster. Clark et al (2012) write that in the international arena, the giving of aid and donations for relief by global actors, western states and their private citizens can exemplify considerations of 'universal generosity', a desire to give for the sake of compassion only and in a manner that 'transcends politics'. This is far from being an adequate framework for understanding why a sovereign state gives disaster relief to its citizens. Since the original Indian constitution does not specifically mention disaster relief, this paper looks to British colonial history and it draws heavily upon Dreze's (1994) analysis of 19 th century Famine Codes for this purpose.
relief might have on the existing rural 'moral economy' (Dreze, 1994: 83) . The Famine Commission regarded that any unconditional relief must not have the effect of rendering irrelevant the existing practices of mutual assistance. By implication therefore, any gratuitous assistance given by the state should be an adjunct to public charity during the harsh times following a disaster, but not an easy substitute for it. Considerations of financial economy also guided the approach taken by the colonial administrators.
The two key elements of the rationale for disaster relief and the ethics of state assistance are well summarised in the following passage from the Famine Commission Report, 1880.
'.....we have to consider the manner in which the proper recipients of public charity can be most effectually ascertained. The problem to be solved is how to avoid the risk of indiscriminate and demoralising profusion on the one hand, and of insufficient and niggardly assistance on the other-how to relieve all who really need relief, and to waste as little public money as possible in the process' (GOI, 1880 cited in Dreze, 1994: 87) .
These basic principles continue to inform the spirit of disaster relief in contemporary India, and as will be shown, the ethics of assistance guiding state policy as well. 
The politics of 'natural calamity'
At the normative core of the relief state is the idea of a 'natural' calamity, which makes victims of innocent people and makes them deserving of relief and assistance (Landis Dauber, 2013 The recently passed Disaster Management Act of 2005 has extended the definition of disaster to cover 'man-made causes and accidents' and the focus is on the 'impact' of the calamity, but there is a 'need to have a concrete list of events' under the Act (GOI, 2010b: 200) . This still leaves the question of which events and causes make it to the list, and the matter has (Chhotray et al, 2013) , and this may well change its leverage on financing for disaster relief.
While investigating these issues in depth has not been the subject of this paper, these bear mention here in order to draw attention to the realpolitik that constrains the financing of disaster relief by the state. Despite the moral appeal of disasters and their potential to mobilise tremendous resources from the state, an intangible (if negotiable) ceiling of available money promotes considerations of financial economy in state response to disasters.
This too contributes to the discussion on why disaster relief is not a legally enforceable right, and links with a larger issue of the legal enforceability of social and economic rights (SERs).
This takes us into the heart of the next section, where I situate central propositions from the working of the relief state within Indian citizenship and justice debates at large.
JUST CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS: A CONTESTED INDIAN HISTORY
'The empirical specificity of citizenship consistently undermines its normative claim of universality ', writes Jayal (2013: 6) . Citizenship is about the ways in which 'states relate to the members of the population over which they govern' (ibid.), and the particular elements making up a 'regime of citizenship' will vary across different societies, and even within the same society over time. All citizenships however are deeply concerned with the management of social differences. The 'substantive distribution' of rights amongst members formally incorporated as citizens of a nation-state depends on the meanings of equality and inequality in that society (Holston, 2008) . In India, formal equality of civil and political rights is marred by significant substantive inequalities in the distribution of social and economic rights (SERs).
Unjust citizenship in India refers to unjust social citizenship. The deeply unequal consequences of disasters confirm this injustice, and firmly situate the experiences of disaster victims within the canvass of social citizenship in India. How then can we interpret the relationship between the state as giver and the individual as a recipient of disaster relief through what we know of how the Indian state has addressed the issue of just citizenship?
Both before and after independence, the story of SERs is one of political negotiation and compromise (Jayal, 2013) . In the 1930s, debates in the Constituent Assembly tasked with the drafting of the Indian Constitution referred to a classification of rights between those that could be legally enforced, and those that could not. Extended arguments crystallised down to the view that there had to be a conceptual distinction between civil and political rights which mandate negative guarantees from the state, and social and economic rights, which require positive state action (ibid.). Constitutional propriety and practicability became the two principal grounds on which civil and political rights went on to constitute the justiciable Fundamental Rights and social and economic rights were housed in the non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy.
There were two objections within constitutional propriety: SERs, it was felt were ideological, and 'lacked political neutrality', and should not be given the 'status of rights' but left as directives for state action, to be settled within the democratic political process (Jayal, 2013: 154) . In the same vein, advocates of this distinction also distinguished between 'policies and rights', and while rights could be constitutionally guaranteed, policies could not and ought therefore not to be mandated within a constitutional document. Arguments about practicability and enforceability centred on a dubious distinction between negative and positive state action, where the latter is necessary for SERs but 'is unaffordable in a resource poor country, and/or unenforceable through courts' (Jayal 2013: 156). These issues have been deeply contentious, with critics pointing out that all rights mandate a measure of both negative and positive intervention by the state. Gandhians and socialists bitterly attacked this division and cried that the Indian constitution had failed the poor.
In independent India, a welfare state treated welfare as a matter of 'official largesse' even 'charity', but delinked the entire subject from a serious consideration of SERs (Jayal, 2013: 167-168) . The severance of the civil and political from the social and economic amounted to an artificial bifurcation of a composite realm of citizens' rights. It led to an approach to welfare on the basis of 'categories of exceptional provision' (Jayal, 2013: 169) , such as backward classes, tribes, minorities from colonial times, and later newer categories like small and marginal farmers, artisans, women and children and so on. The unmistakable irony of restricting SERs to those deemed as 'deserving' in special 'boxes' was that all those who
were not in these boxes were well provided enough anyway not to require such assistance.
Moreover, by not being universal, social and economic provisioning never took the form of rights at all, and did not 'attach to citizenship in the way in which civil and political rights were integrally linked with it (Jayal, 2013: 170) . This trend has continued with the addition of new and contentious categories of assistance in the form of the 'Below Poverty Line' in 1997. for children of all ages in addition to four additional categories of people including migrants, homeless, the urban poor and emergency and disaster affected persons'). So while there is a 'perfunctory nod in the direction of universalism', it will not be universal (Jayal, 2013: 181) .
Targeting versus universalism in social provisioning has vigorously engaged academic scholars and politicians in India alike, (Dreze and Sen, 2013; Panagariya and Bhagwati, 2012) , and the arguments have been trenchant in the run up to the national elections in 2014.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to refer to this debate in detail, one salient point of relevance here is what targeting does to the question of citizenship at large. Evidence from social welfare policy in Europe, where universalism has been a very influential principle, suggests that this has 'been most critical for securing the political support of the middle classes for the welfare state' (Judt, 2010 cited in Dreze and Sen, 2013: 195) . Improved social achievements in a number of India's most progressive states, like Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, are also based on 'universalistic and inclusive social policies' (Dreze and Sen, 2013: 194) . Targeting and the selective provision of services are detrimental to civil solidarity (Jayal, 2013) . Without the social consensus that no individual can be allowed to fall below a certain minimum level of well-being, targeted welfare provision makes the society appear to be less cohesive as some citizens resent having to contribute towards this purpose (ibid.).
There are significant obstacles to the realisation of SERs, both those that have been considered for legal recognition and those that have not. As such, there are searing criticisms that rights for social citizenship are being used to manage popular discontent in the face of growing inequalities and are nothing but a legitimating device to soften the harsh effects of capitalism (Marshall, 1950; Jayal, 2013 ). Yet, there is general agreement that the 'opportunity for appeal to the courts against the violation or non-provision of social rights' afforded by these new social rights is an unambiguous good (Jayal, 2013: 195) . Access to the formal justice system remains extremely difficult though, and the few successful cases are a result of proactive lobbying by an engaged civil society constituting various active citizens groups.
This brief peak into state action for just citizenship in India suggests that 'justiciability' of social and economic rights has been a contentious process, and even when legal recognition has come, on cautious terms, the original severance of SERs from universal full bodied civil and political rights has undermined their coverage and strength. Interpreting the absence of justiciable rights to disaster relief within this history of rights in India becomes much easier.
However, the absence of justiciable rights in the arena of disaster relief is juxtaposed with the presence of discernible moral claims for citizens in their temporary roles as disaster victims.
The final section of this paper considers the terrain of citizenship as enacted through these moral claims, in the aftermath of a disaster, and teases out the principal conclusions for justice.
CITIZENSHIP AS VICTIMHOOD: POST-CYCLONE ODISHA
The famine and relief codes of India, as discussed in section 2, contained more than the obligation of the state towards disaster victims. These also included a clear moral code of conduct for the victims themselves: able bodied persons would actively seek work on public works provided by the state, and for those unable to work, gratuitous relief would be granted The state responded by strengthening security visibly, with armed police vehicles being sent to accompany relief materials (NIE, November 3). The state vigilance department got involved, and formed 'eight special squads' to ensure the smooth distribution of relief materials and also to stop the hoarding and black marketing of essential commodities (NIE, November 4). Realising the limits of its measures, the state appealed to the people for selfvigilantism, to 'control' the anti-social elements. Very soon, looting became a public order issue and the state government had to resort to airdropping essentials, which immediately put more able-bodied victims ahead in the game. Intense fighting broke out when the odd relief truck arrived in roadside villages in the worst affected block (Erasama in Jagatsinghpur district). These men also prevented the trucks from reaching remote, sea-side villages, whose residents bitterly recall these incidents even ten years later. Relief materials were also routinely stolen from ill-secured panchayat 12 buildings. Above the chaos, there were fights over 'criteria' for distribution, which were neither clearly laid down by the panchayat functionaries in charge, nor understood by the gathered crowds.
11 Similar experiences have been reported after disasters in other places too; such as Gujarat after the 2001 earthquake (Simpson, 2008) . 12 A three tier system of elected local self-government at the district, block and village levels in India. the state's Below Poverty Line list (BPL), even when they did not meet official criteria, many recipients of disaster relief manipulated their positions and connections to extract state resources for themselves. This severely disadvantaged those without the cash or connections to influence the gatekeepers to these resources. The experience of disaster relief only echoed the injustice of social citizenship. Material or economic inequalities were accompanied by stark differentiation by gender and age.
As the hapless victims of loss, those who could were able to able to go further, vindicated by their moral stance, genuine as well as adopted. Indeed, the strategic use of loss as a resource to bargain for more assistance from the state is carried out in the full knowledge that such assistance is not really a right with a definitive meaning and extent, but a temporary bounty, the provenance of which lay in the disaster itself. This was matched by a stance of leniency from the state, which would be unheard of for regular development schemes. After the 2008 floods, the Special Relief Commission issued an instruction to all Revenue Inspectors to 'err on the side of generosity' while assessing damage 13 . At the same time, such leniency was not countenanced in all aspects of disaster relief operations, and certainly people were not able to bargain for amounts greater than those set out in the CRF norms. There were one or two reported cases where recipients, angered by the successful manipulation of a few dominant persons, took on an active role as 'aware citizens' by complaining to the district administration for actions to be taken against corrupt lower functionaries. 
CONCLUSION
Disasters reiterate social injustices by impacting upon differently positioned individuals and groups unequally. This paper brings a novel perspective to the discussion of disasters in terms of justice by turning the spotlight on disaster relief by the nation-state, using the case of India.
It focuses on the relationship that develops between the state as the giver of disaster relief and the individual as its worthy recipient, and delineates their distinctive attributes in these roles.
It relies on a reading of colonial famine and contemporary relief codes respectively to characterise the Indian 'relief' state to arrive at the following problem: did the framing of disaster relief as a moral obligation but not as a justiciable right matter in the state's dispensation of justice?
To answer this question, the paper launches into a larger discussion about the Indian state's approach towards social and economic rights for its citizens. Equal civil and political rights for all Indian citizens were guaranteed by the constitution, but not social and economic rights which did not 'attach' to Indian citizenship in the same way. Substantive inequalities in the social and economic domain are the hallmark of unjust citizenship in India, without which citizens do not experience the full benefits of equal civil and political rights. The paper discusses how the justiciability of SERs has been a troubled issue right from the Constituent Assembly debates preceding the framing of the constitution, with doubts being cast on the grounds of constitutional propriety of including rights that required expansive, positive state action as well as practicability, both affordability and enforceability.
Hesitation to attach constitutional weight to positive state action to enforce universal social and economic rights continued well after independence. The Indian state is a welfare state, but welfare itself was disbursed as charity, with special categories of exception of those who were needy enough to be deserving of state social provision. The irony was that SERs were the preserve of those who could not participate in the formal conditions of equal citizenship, and those who were well enough to, did not need these special SERs. In the recent and somewhat curious emphasis on SERs in the era of economic liberalisation and neoliberal reform, when rights to education, work and food, have received legal recognition (and the right to education is now a fundamental right), also the process has continued to be divorced from inclusive universal social provisioning. The criticism that without the political and social consensus needed to ensure a common minimum standard of dignity and well-being there can be no just social citizenship is a compelling one. Moreover, without the conditions in place for the realisation of SERs, the value of legal recognition is in itself contested.
This brief history of SERs in India helps to explain why disaster relief, in essence a social and economic right, has not been constituted as a justiciable right. Moreover, as the paper shows, the politics of natural calamity heavily impacts upon the financing of disaster relief, and there are massive constraints to resources that states can command for this purpose. And yet, disasters are not ordinary events; they are accompanied by a powerful narrative of 'blameless loss' for innocent victims and the Indian state is compelled to come to the assistance of those affected. This moral imperative is far from being a weak anchoring for state action, and there is far more public support for state response to disasters than 'routine welfare'. Disaster victims can and do exercise a moral stance of deservedness while claiming state attention, even leniency. This, the paper contends, constitutes an interesting new dimension to the experience of citizenship as 'victimhood' in India.
To substantiate this notion, the paper draws from rich evidence in post-cyclone Odisha where the experiences of accessing relief are marked by a range of behaviours, not all of which fulfil the moral expectations around duty to work and assist others implicitly contained in the famine/relief codes. In the experience of hostility and aggression, looting and beggary, disaster victims displayed the different contours of citizenship as victimhood, and adopted a particularly desperate mode of behaviour that only a disaster can elicit. In the relatively calmer and more calculated phase of negotiating ex-gratia assistance for loss, disaster victims suffered the usual experiences of collusion and corruptions by local officials, with the difference that the 'victims' too exploited a moral position of deservedness to cheat and dupe local officials to get more. And yet, in both these contexts, access to disaster relief was severely differentiated, and those with better resources and connections to gatekeepers, as well as physical strength, fared better. There was no way of ensuring a dignified and equitable experience of relief.
In the final analysis, the paper concludes that disaster relief re-enacts unjust citizenship, much like any other arena of state-individual relationship in India. The lack of a justiciable social and economic right is not any more evidence of the lack of dispensation of justice by the state towards its citizens, than it is an affirmation of the approach taken to social citizenship in India. Besides, it is not entirely clear either, if there would be discernible advantages in the legal recognition of disaster relief. Would it be helpful if the Indian state were to identify special categories of exception amongst the disaster affected peoples to allocate rights, and make these justiciable in a court of law? The difficulties that citizens regularly face in dealing with the courts in this country make this a sobering proposition. A much more compelling issue is that the worst effects of a disaster are generally experienced by those who are also the worst sufferers of niggardly, poorly executed and exclusionary social provisioning. Disasters are unkind mirrors to society, and very quickly reveal the debasing and unjust character of citizenship. Any serious attempt to address the injustices of disasters cannot be restricted to making disaster relief a justiciable right, and must involve a larger conversation about the role of the state in improving the conditions of just social citizenship, whether through the public provision of welfare or the pursuit of redistributive policies. This is the biggest lesson of viewing disaster relief as an arena of justice.
